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ACT III OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
Paul Horwitz* 
INTRODUCTION 
Law is filled with stories without endings.  Case reports and law 
review articles generally conclude with the judgment on a case.  Once 
judgment is rendered, either by a judge or by a scholar analyzing an 
opinion, it is unusual for anyone to consider what happens next.1  In drama, 
a gun that appears onstage in Act I is sure to go off in Act III: the play has 
not ended until there is a climax; until the full narrative has reached its 
conclusion.2  In law, the curtain often draws shut abruptly at the end of Act 
II. 
One obvious reason for this is that the law and its students generally 
focus on a single question: the question of legal power—especially the 
power of courts to order some action and make it stick.3  Authority, 
jurisdiction, liability or immunity; terms like these are the meat and drink of 
the law—the keys that unlock the answer to the question of who gets to 
―say what the law is.‖4 
It is all perfectly natural, and perfectly odd.  Consider some famous 
cases that turn on the question of the nature and limits of judicial power.  It 
is natural to want to know, in a case in which a police department has been 
using a potentially lethal ―chokehold‖ method of restraint, whether the 
department can be made to cease its conduct.5  If the government is accused 
of bombing a country with which it is not at war, you naturally want to 
know whether it can be ordered to ground its planes.6  If a private company 
is collaborating with a state to engage in the extraordinary rendition of 
individuals to nations that commit torture, you want to know whether the 
company can be held to account, or whether any litigation should be 
 
*
  Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law.  I am grateful to the participants 
and commenters at the session on Hosanna-Tabor held at the second Annual Law and Religion 
Roundtable at Northwestern University School of Law in Summer 2011. 
1
  As always, there are exceptions.  See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional 
Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63 (1998). 
2
  See ACADEMIC DICTIONARY OF FICTION 40 (Ashish Pandey ed., 2005) (citing Anton Chekhov). 
3
  See, e.g., Christoph Menke, Law and Violence, 22 LAW & LIT. 1, 11 (2010) (―Law is about power, 
its own power.‖).  The canonical discussion is Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 
1601 (1986). 
4
  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (link). 
5
  See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (link). 
6
  See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (link). 
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dismissed because it would require the revelation of sensitive confidential 
information.7 
Unless your focus is narrow and your curiosity highly limited, 
however, you will also want to know what happens next.  Unless you 
confuse the ―is‖ of judicial or governmental power with a moral ―ought,‖ 
you are unlikely to think that the fact that a party, public or private, can do 
something without legal consequences means that it should.  Some party 
will be left with the final authority to act.  However, how it acts matters as 
much or more than the fact that it can act.  To say that a dispute is out of the 
court‘s hands does not mean it is in no one‘s hands at all.  The party with 
the authority will still have a choice about what to do with that authority.  
And when, in one of these judicial dramas, the court‘s obligations end, our 
obligations as citizens are just beginning.  We must decide whether to bow 
out of the tale, leaving the party with the authority to act as it wishes, or 
whether we should take soft or hard action to persuade it to act as we think 
it should.  Legal power is not always the last word. 
In its 2011 October Term, the Supreme Court will decide whether to 
uphold the ―ministerial exception‖ in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & School v. EEOC.8  This judicial doctrine, rooted in the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, provides that churches are entitled to legal 
immunity from employment discrimination claims brought by employees 
acting in a ―ministerial‖ position.9 
If experience is any guide, the discussion on both sides of this question 
will focus on Act II.  It will focus on power, jurisdiction, and immunity.  At 
the extremes, it will involve arguments over whether the Religion Clauses 
require complete immunity from suit in ministerial discrimination cases or 
whether they require churches to be treated the same as any other 
employer.10  And in many respects, there will be a tendency, more or less 
 
7
  See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (link); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (link). 
8
  131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (link).  For the oral arguments, held on October 5, 2011, see Transcript of 
Oral Argument, Hosanna-Tabor, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (No. 10533), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-553.pdf (link). 
9
  See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2006) (link); 
Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350–51 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (link); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461–62 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (link); 
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168–69 (4th Cir. 1985) (link); 
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (link).  As one court put it, the basic rule 
suggests that one or both of the Religion Clauses ―deprive[] a federal court of jurisdiction to hear a Title 
VII employment discrimination suit brought against a church by a member of its clergy, even when the 
church‘s challenged actions are not based on religious doctrine.‖  Combs, 173 F.3d at 345. 
10
  There are intermediate positions, of course.  One could argue that the Religion Clauses do not 
require the ministerial exception but that legislatures are free to enact such exceptions.  Or one could 
concede that the ministerial exception exists as a matter of constitutional law but argue over the 
occasions for its application.  It is possible to take an intermediate position like this without confusing 
―is‖ and ―ought,‖ although some people will do so even then. 
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overt, to treat the answer to the power question as dispositive of the 
question of whether churches ought to invoke the ministerial exception 
whenever they wish. 
In this Essay, I argue that we are wrong to treat Hosanna-Tabor and 
the ministerial exception doctrine as ending with Act II.  Rather, in thinking 
about the doctrine, we—especially those of us who have championed the 
ministerial exception11—have a scholarly and moral obligation to think 
about what happens next, assuming that the Supreme Court reaffirms the 
doctrine and its constitutionality.  We need to do so from a perspective that 
acknowledges the dangers as well as the value of church autonomy.  This 
perspective treats churches as imperfect institutions, not saintly ones, and 
asks what sorts of nonlegal levers—from internal debates within churches 
to external public criticism—might encourage churches to exercise their 
authority sensitively and appropriately.  Conversely, opponents of the 
ministerial exception doctrine ought to cease caricaturizing churches as 
self-interested institutions whose only apparent goal is to escape legal 
liability for egregious employment practices.  These critics should think 
instead about the role that nonlegal mechanisms can play in encouraging 
fairness to employees. 
I begin by offering a defense of the ministerial exception doctrine.  
Because other writers in this colloquy focus on that question, I will keep my 
own contributions relatively brief.12  I then discuss the role of both internal 
religious discussion and external public criticism as tools for policing the 
use of the ministerial exception.  I argue that ―Act III‖ thinking is necessary 
not only to properly evaluate the law in this area, but also because scholars 
and citizens have a moral obligation to think about what autonomous 
institutions like churches ought to do, not just about how the law allocates 
authority in this area. 
I. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AS POWER 
The basic defense of the ministerial exception starts with history and 
first principles.  The historical argument is ultimately a recapitulation of 
Western legal and political history itself.  As Michael McConnell puts it: 
 
[F]rom at least the time of Pope Gelasius [in the fifth 
century A.D.], standard legal thinking in Western Europe 
was based on the theory of Two Kingdoms—the idea that 
God created two different forms of authority, two swords 
that were clearly distinguished: spiritual and temporal, 
 
11
  See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (forthcoming 2012) (on file with 
author); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009) (link). 
12
  For a more extensive presentation of my views, see the works cited supra note 11. 
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sacred and secular, church and state.  These spheres were 
undeniably separate, and not because the state chose to 
make them so.13 
 
That general concept endured even after the schism in Western 
Christianity caused by the Reformation.  Lutheran thought, for instance, did 
away with the concept of ―two swords,‖ but replaced it with one of ―two 
kingdoms.‖14  Despite their differences, a common theme ran through these 
formulations: ―the spiritual and temporal powers‖ must ―remain separate in 
function,‖ and at a minimum, the temporal authority has ―no power 
to . . . mete out religious discipline.‖15 
The American tradition of separation, revolutionary as it seemed, is 
basically continuous with this history.  As one of the amici curiae in the 
Hosanna-Tabor case observes, ―This differentiation between the 
institutions of church and state has become a part of the American 
constitutional tradition.‖16  Indeed, the tradition predates the Constitution 
itself.  It can be found in the writings of Roger Williams,17 the structure of 
the Puritan communities in New England, and elsewhere.18  The preamble 
to the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts Bay in 1648, for example, 
proclaimed: ―[O]ur churches and civil state have been planted, and grown 
up (like two twins),‖ and to conflate the two would lead to the ―misery (if 
not ruin) of both.‖19  Closer to the Revolutionary Era, it was apparent in the 
thinking of John Adams, who admired the vision of separate spheres 
championed by the Puritans and made sure that the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 guaranteed the right of churches to select their own 
ministers without state interference.20  It was also evident in the ―strikingly 
 
13
  Michael W. McConnell, Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 7, 8 (link).  For similar 
sentiments, see, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1869 (2009) (book review) (link); John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 1869 (2003) (book review). 
14
  See, e.g., William B. Ewald, The Protestant Revolutions and Western Law, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 
181, 188 (2005) (reviewing HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE 
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003)). 
15
  Witte, supra note 13, at 1878–79. 
16
  Brief Amici Curiae of Professor Eugene Volokh et al. in Support of Petitioner at 6, Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 
2470847, at *6 [hereinafter Volokh Brief]. 
17
  See, e.g., Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 289, 290–91 (2005). 
18
  See Horwitz, supra note 11, at 100–04.  For other examples, see Volokh Brief, supra note 16, at 
12–18. 
19
  LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY A2 (1648) (Max Farrand ed., 1929). 
20
  See JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
EARLY MODERN CALVINISM 309–11 (2007); see also Joshua D. Dunlap, Note, When Big Brother Plays 
God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 
2016 (2007) (quoting the relevant passage of Massachusetts‘s constitution). 
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jurisdictional‖ language that James Madison employed in his influential 
Memorial and Remonstrance: ―[I]n matters of Religion, no man‘s right is 
abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and . . . Religion is wholly 
exempt from its cognizance.‖21  In the post-revolutionary period, ―[t]he key 
to resolving‖ church versus state disputes ―was to define a private sphere, 
protected against interference by the vested rights doctrine and the 
separation of church and state.‖22  The American tradition, in short, has long 
embraced ―a constitutional order in which the institutions of religion . . . are 
distinct from, other than, and meaningfully independent of, the institutions 
of government.‖23 
Some central constitutional principles rest on this historical foundation.  
The most important is the oft-repeated notion that religious institutions in 
this nation must have the ―power to decide for themselves, free from state 
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and 
doctrine.‖24  Similarly, the state may not interfere with a church‘s selection 
or rejection of its religious members, let alone its leaders.25 
A third principle regularly derived both from this history and from 
broader views about the judicial role in church-state cases is that judges 
cannot evaluate the kinds of religious questions that come up in 
employment discrimination cases involving ministerial employees, among 
other places.  This position is sometimes called the ―hands off‖ rule.26  One 
standard argument for this rule is that judges are simply incompetent to 
address religious questions.  For strategic reasons, opponents of the 
ministerial exception focus substantially on judicial incompetence.  It 
allows them to argue that many ministerial exception cases raise issues that 
 
21
  Smith, supra note 13, at 1880 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting JAMES 
MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE 59, 60 (J.F. Maclear ed., 1995)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
22
  Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court’s Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on 
Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7, 42 (2001). 
23
  Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 
ST. JOHN‘S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 523 (2007). 
24
  Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 
(1952) (link). 
25
  See, e.g., id. at 119 (observing that free exercise of religion entails freedom of ―an ecclesiastical 
right, the Church‘s choice of its hierarchy‖); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 
U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (―[I]t is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential 
qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them.‖) (link); Bouldin v. 
Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139–40 (1872) (recognizing that courts ―cannot decide who ought to 
be members of the church‖) (link); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–59 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(―The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. . . .  Matters touching 
this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern[]‖ and lie ―beyond the 
purview of civil authorities.‖). 
26
  See generally Samuel J. Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious 
Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 793 (2009) (discussing the Supreme Court‘s 
―hands-off approach‖) (link). 
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judges are competent to decide,27 and that courts engaged in case-by-case 
analyses of such disputes end up entangled in even more theological 
questions.28 
So the conventional justifications for the ministerial exception consist 
of a set of simple principles that, its supporters contend, have a long 
historical pedigree.  Courts cannot decide religious disputes.  Thus, they 
may not resolve questions of church doctrine or governance.  And they may 
not interfere in a church‘s decision about who constitutes an acceptable 
leader or member.  These principles focus on the fundamentals of religious 
freedom—those rights without which basic religious freedom could not be 
said to exist—and on the incapacities of courts.  For many supporters of the 
ministerial exception, however, they are still just surface matters, 
conclusions that follow from deeper premises.  They lead us back to the 
central question that occupies the law, at least up through Act II: the 
question of power. 
Here, some of us see a fundamental and perhaps more radical principle 
underlying not only the ministerial exception, but the law of religious 
freedom generally: courts, and the state itself, are simply not authorized to 
intervene in life at the heart of churches.  At a deep level, these questions lie 
beyond the reach of the state altogether.  The two kingdoms of temporal 
and spiritual authority, of church and state, constitute two separate 
sovereigns.  The state can no more intervene in the sovereign affairs of 
churches than it can in the sovereign affairs of Mexico or Canada.  This 
allocation of authority is not intended to signal the primacy of churches or 
the inferiority of the state.  It is a double-sided settlement as ancient as 
Western political culture itself, one that says that ―government is not the 
sole possessor of sovereignty‖ and that churches ―exercise within the area 
of [their] competence an authority so effective as to justify labeling it a 
sovereign authority‖ all their own.29  Whatever a church‘s ―area[s] of 
competence‖ may be, it extends at least to fundamental questions of church 
structure and leadership, and thus removes the state from control over 
ministerial employment decisions like those in Hosanna-Tabor.  As radical 
as this description may seem, it lies at the heart of the Western church-state 
settlement.  It is reflected in the many decisions in which courts have said 
 
27
  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law and Religion Professors in Support of Respondents at 26, 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-533), 
2011 WL 3532698, at *26 (―Hosanna-Tabor incorrectly assumes that adjudicating ministers‘ 
antidiscrimination claims will require courts to decide questions beyond their institutional competence.  
A court may decide [a plaintiff‘s] retaliation claim without ever becoming entangled in doctrinal or 
theological questions.‖) [hereinafter Professors‘ Brief]. 
28
  See id. at 32–35. 
29
  Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 
91, 91 (1953). 
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that the ministerial exception is not merely an affirmative defense but a 
jurisdictional matter.30 
The power-based argument for the ministerial exception is not novel.  
But it is radical, or at least it may seem so to those who have grown 
accustomed to thinking that the state is the ultimate arbiter.  Its opponents 
have room to argue that it runs contrary to the statist orientation of modern 
law, exemplified by the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Employment Division 
v. Smith, which said that the Free Exercise Clause could not stand in the 
way of any neutral and generally applicable law that only incidentally 
burdens religion.31 
But even the relatively statist modern Supreme Court has recognized 
that there are realms the law is not free to enter.  If the greatest weakness of 
the proponents of the ministerial exception is the sweeping nature of their 
claims, its opponents‘ greatest weakness is that they ignore the fact that the 
Court has never pushed too hard on the rule of general applicability and 
other imperial claims on the part of the state.  It has always pulled back, 
recognizing limits to the state‘s reach where central internal religious 
practices are involved.  Smith itself is an example.  Citing its long history of 
deference and abstention in cases involving church property and 
employment, the Court reaffirmed the central Free Exercise principle that 
government must not ―lend its power to one or the other side in 
controversies over religious authority or dogma.‖32  Even after Smith, core 
areas of church doctrine and governance remain untouched by the state.33 
 
30
  See, e.g., EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 775 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (link); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007) (link); Tomic 
v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006); see generally Gregory A. Kalscheur, 
S.J., Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-
Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43 (2008) (exploring 
the jurisdictional aspects of the ministerial exception) (link).  For a broader historical argument to this 
effect, see Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent & Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early 
American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385; see also Volokh Brief, supra note 16, at 4 (―The civil 
authority lacks ‗competence‘ to intervene in such matters, not so much because they lie beyond its 
technical or intellectual capacity, but because they lie beyond its jurisdictional power.‖). 
31
  494 U.S. 872 (1990) (link). 
32
  Id. at 877. 
33
  See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 3919718, at *6 (noting that ―Smith preserved a 
longstanding distinction between internal church governance, including selection of ministers, and 
conscientious objection to general regulation,‖ only the latter of which is subject to Smith‘s rule of 
neutrality, and arguing that this distinction has been around since at least the time of John Locke) 
[hereinafter Reply Brief]. 
Besides Smith, the other case emphasized by opponents of the ministerial exception is Jones v. Wolf, 
in which the Supreme Court held that states may (but need not) resolve church property disputes by 
giving legal recognition to the non-religious language of church constitutions, property deeds, state 
statutes, and other relevant legal documents, just as they would in other property disputes.  443 U.S. 595 
(1979) (link).  Because Jones allows courts to use the ―neutral principles‖ approach rather than requiring 
deference to churches in all cases, some critics argue that it ―seriously undercuts any argument that [the 
Court‘s prior] cases guarantee a broad right of church autonomy.‖  Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the 
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In short, if the advocates of the ministerial exception can be criticized 
for thinking too big, emphasizing church autonomy in a general way while 
neglecting important practical and doctrinal details, its opponents can be 
criticized for overreading (and sometimes misreading) the doctrine and 
neglecting the fundamental principles that lie behind it.  The ministerial 
exception is not some incidental, ad hoc creation.  It is a fundamental part 
of the structure of American religious freedom; a recognition of the basic 
idea that the First Amendment, the Constitution, and Western 
constitutionalism more generally guarantee a ―free Church in a free State.‖34  
It ensures, at a minimum, that absent extraordinary circumstances, churches 
must have a free hand in selecting those who perform basic religious 
functions.35  One need not accept the widest possible account of church 
autonomy in order to agree on that much.36  As a legal matter, then, I 
 
Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption From Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1965, 1987 (2007) (link).  They read the phrase ―neutral principles‖ in Jones together with the 
―neutral and generally applicable law‖ language of Smith to suggest a general rejection of church 
autonomy.  On this view, Jones stands for the proposition that courts should ―[a]pply employment 
discrimination law to a religious employer in the same way it would be applied to a secular employer.‖  
Professors‘ Brief, supra note 27, at 36. 
As I have written elsewhere, however, Jones ―was, in short, an effort to accommodate church 
autonomy, not to eliminate it.‖  Horwitz, supra note 11, at 118 (emphasis omitted); see also Perry Dane, 
“Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1743–44 (arguing that the neutral principles approach 
makes sense only ―in the context of an effort to effectuate a religious community‘s effort to specify the 
form that the community‘s autonomy should take through some type of private ordering‖) (link).  Its 
point was to allow churches to use legal language in deeds, trusts, and other documents to insulate 
themselves from judicial interference.  In any event, even Jones says explicitly that the ―neutral 
principles‖ approach only applies where a court can interpret a legal document relating to church 
property disputes without deciding questions of ―religious doctrine or polity.‖  Jones, 443 U.S. at 602. 
34
  ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 78, 99 (photo. reprint 2007) (1898).  Cf. EEOC v. 
Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that the lower courts‘ ministerial 
exception decisions ―rely on a long line of Supreme Court cases that affirm the fundamental right of 
churches to ‗decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine.‘‖ (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952))) (link). 
35
  See, e.g., Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 10 (Hosanna-Tabor ―is about institutional separation—
the least controversial core of separation of church and state‖); id. (―The government cannot control the 
internal affairs of churches any more than churches can control the institutions of government.‖). 
36
  See, e.g., Volokh Brief, supra note 16, at 32 (conceding that not everyone counts as a ―minister‖ 
for purposes of the ministerial exception); id. at 39 (noting that ―there are difficult questions to be asked 
and fine lines to be drawn‖ in the doctrine).  That said, one advantage of an emphasis on the ministerial 
exception as an example of the limits of state power is that it reduces or eliminates some of the hangover 
questions that its opponents argue will persist as long as it is narrowly applied.  For example, it has been 
argued that as long as courts decide who counts as a minister on a case-by-case basis, they will end up 
far more entangled with religion than they would be if the ministerial exception were simply done away 
with.  See, e.g., Professors‘ Brief, supra note 27, at 32–35.  Those entanglement questions will largely 
disappear if, as they should, courts, recognizing the limits of their authority in this realm, defer 
substantially to the churches‘ own determinations that an employee is a minister.  See Reply Brief, supra 
note 33, at 22 (arguing that a broad ministerial exception rule ―is far less entangling than respondents‘ 
invitation to probe deeply into every case‖). 
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believe the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor should affirm the existence 
and constitutional status of the ministerial exception. 
II. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AS RESPONSIBILITY 
At first glance, the question of whether the ministerial exception exists 
may seem to be the only, or at least the most important, question raised by 
Hosanna-Tabor.  It is neither.  Just as we ought to care whether the United 
States actually bombs Cambodia and not just that the court says it will not 
interfere with such a decision, we likewise ought to care about what 
churches actually do with the ministerial exception, not just that it exists.  
We ought to care, in other words, about what actually happens on the 
ground in Act III when we move beyond the basic Act I or II question of 
power and think about what churches do with that power. 
Thus, suppose that the Supreme Court either affirms the constitutional 
status of the ministerial exception or, alternatively, holds that it is not 
required, but permits Congress and the state legislatures to enact such an 
exception.  Suppose also that the scope of the ministerial exception, 
whether constitutional or statutory, is broad: churches are given substantial 
deference in declaring a church employee to be a ―minister‖ who falls under 
the exception and the exception applies to a variety of actions, including the 
retaliation action brought by Cheryl Perich in the Hosanna-Tabor case.  
What then?  What should churches do with their victory?  Should citizens 
consider their own role in the conversation to be over? 
Surely a church‘s deliberations as to when to invoke the exception and 
how to treat complaints will not end once the ministerial exception is firmly 
in place.  While courts must defer to the church‘s decision, deference does 
not tell us what the church should do.37  The answer to that question will 
vary, just as churches vary.  Assume for a moment that the ministerial 
exception is somewhat limited in scope, applying only to cases where a 
 
It is also worth acknowledging a broader argument made by the opponents of the ministerial 
exception: despite the occasional use of the language of church autonomy, courts frequently subject 
churches to various legal regimes, which they could not do if churches were truly autonomous.  See, 
e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 96, 105 n.60 (2011) (link).  A strong view of church autonomy 
does raise questions about those cases.  Again, however, all that is at issue in a case like Hosanna-Tabor 
is that, at a minimum, churches must be able to select and dismiss ministerial employees without fear of 
legal intrusion.  See, e.g., Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 10 (arguing that the rule that ―government 
cannot control the internal affairs of churches,‖ including key employment decisions involving 
ministerial employees, is part of the ―least controversial core of separation of church and state‖).  To 
argue against the doctrine altogether because it has some limits is no more sensible than it would be to 
argue that because employers can sometimes raise bona fide occupational qualifications as a defense in 
employment discrimination actions, we should simply do away with employment discrimination law. 
37
  See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072–73 (2008) 
(defining deference as ―a decisionmaker following a determination made by some other individual or 
institution that it might not otherwise have reached had it decided the same question independently‖) 
(link). 
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church asserts that some employment action involves a direct conflict with 
religious doctrine.38  Then the interaction between that church‘s doctrine 
and a forbidden employment action becomes legally relevant.  It might well 
matter to the church for nonlegal reasons too.  A church that strongly 
opposes racial discrimination, as virtually all of them do,39 might welcome 
the availability of legal remedies in that situation for a variety of reasons: a 
belief that the church should generally obey the law, a belief that racial 
discrimination is wrong and deserves a legal remedy, and so on. 
However, what if the ministerial exception is treated as genuinely 
jurisdictional in nature, leaving plaintiffs with no legal remedy in 
antidiscrimination cases involving ministerial employees?  A church would 
still have a number of options, and its choices would still vary, depending 
on a mix of factors.  A church that opposes discrimination might still want 
to provide ministers who complain of discrimination with an internal 
dispute resolution process and a set of remedies equivalent to those 
provided by the law.  It might conclude that nothing less would satisfy its 
own religious belief that discrimination is wrong, and that the church owes 
it to victims of discrimination (and to God) to make them whole.  Or it 
might provide meaningful alternative remedies due to a fear on the part of 
church leadership that a failure to take such claims seriously would lead to 
dissent and a loss of confidence in the leadership.  In either case, the point 
is clear: the ministerial exception is not the same thing as indifference to the 
goals of civil rights laws, nor does it mean that particular churches would 
inevitably seek total immunity.  Reasons of deep religious conscience, as 
well as practical concerns about the reaction of members, might lead a 




  See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 448 F.3d 615, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 13135, at *2 (3d Cir. 
2006) (holding that a church must argue that discrimination is required by one of its religious tenets 
before the ministerial exception can apply), vacated, 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006); Elvig v. Calvin 
Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing sexual harassment claim to proceed 
against church where it did not offer a religious reason for its conduct) (link).  The Gannon opinion was 
vacated and replaced by a broader decision holding that the ministerial exception applies even where the 
basis for the employment action is non-religious.  See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303–04 
(3d Cir. 2006) (link). 
39
  See, e.g., THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH ¶ 430 (2008), available 
at http://www.nyac.com/pages/detail/1755 (―[A]ppointments are made without regard to race, ethnic 
origin, gender, color, disability, marital status, or age, except for the provisions of mandatory 
retirement.‖) (link).  For these and other citations to specific provisions of church discipline, I am 
indebted to Chris Lund for his recent article defending the ministerial exception.  See Christopher C. 
Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 101 (2011) (link). 
40
  It should also be noted that even under this strong jurisdictional reading of the ministerial 
exception, not all disputes involving ministers would necessarily be outside the jurisdiction of the courts.  
As the church notes in its reply brief in Hosanna-Tabor: 
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Another question is how churches should treat the claimants in such 
cases.  The fact that the judicial process would be unavailable does not 
mean churches would lack any interest, religious or otherwise, in providing 
due process to claimants.  Indeed, some churches provide strong procedural 
protections for ministers dismissed under these circumstances—protections 
that predate the judicial recognition of the ministerial exception.41  Consider 
the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, whose conduct is at issue in 
Hosanna-Tabor.  Although the church considers itself the sole arbiter of 
employment disputes involving its ministers,42 its dispute resolution 
procedures are no charade.  They include a basic trial process, limited 
discovery, the right to counsel, and an appeal process.  They also establish 
neutral tribunals whose members are maintained by the Synod itself, not the 
local congregation.43  The church‘s substantive standards are also real.  
Indeed, the Synod‘s laws might ultimately have vindicated Perich‘s 
complaint.44  As one amicus group of experts on religious tribunals 
observes, although ―[r]eligious court systems can be quite varied,‖ many 
―share certain primary characteristics, including discernible substantive 
standards and procedural rights,‖ as well as ―a stated commitment to even-
handedness‖ and an effort to ―ensure that the religious organization is not 
unfairly favored in the crafting and execution of the process.‖45 
 
When a church signs a contract written in secular language, the contract can be 
enforced unless the basic dispute is entangled in religious questions.  So, for 
example, a contract claim challenging discharge for cause generally cannot 
proceed, but a contract claim for unpaid salary or benefits generally can.  Such 
secular contract claims have always co-existed with the ministerial exception. 
 
Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 9.  This is further evidence that the ministerial exception‘s opponents 
misread Jones v. Wolf.  See supra note 33.  Jones does not mean churches are never entitled to 
autonomy.  Instead, by allowing churches to draft employment contracts with ministers that are at least 
partly enforceable in court, it allows churches to voluntarily limit the scope of their autonomy, leaving 
room for some legally enforceable employment claims by ministers where, for various reasons, churches 
wish to expose aspects of their relationships with ministers to the jurisdiction of the civil courts.  See 
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
41
  See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs 
(―COLPA‖) Filed on Behalf of the Orthodox Jewish Organizations and Rabbinical Courts in Support of 
Petitioner at 7–8, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) 
(No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470841, at *7–8 (discussing the history of rabbinic courts) [hereinafter 
COLPA Brief]. 
42
  See HANDBOOK OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH: MISSOURI SYNOD § 1.10.2 (2004), available at 
www.lcms.org/Document.fdoc?src=lcm&id=926 (link). 
43
  See Lund, supra note 39, at 142–43; see also Steven R. Hadley, Handbook of American Church 
Courts, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 251, 263 (2000) (citing the Seventh-Day Adventists as one example of a 
church whose dispute resolution procedures call for ―neutral, impartial, and independent‖ adjudicators). 
44
  See Lund, supra note 39, at 143 (noting that ―the Synod‘s church courts would only approve of 
Perich‘s call being terminated in rare and specifically delineated circumstances‖). 
45
  Brief of Religious Tribunal Experts Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6–7, Hosanna-
Tabor, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 2470843, at *6–7 [hereinafter Religious Tribunal 
Experts‘ Brief]. 
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In short, it would be wrong to end one‘s inquiry at Act II and assume 
that the ministerial exception leaves claimants with no recourse whatsoever.  
Unsurprisingly, given the long history of church jurisdiction over internal 
religious matters, churches themselves regularly provide meaningful 
procedural and substantive justice in disputes with their members or 
leaders.46 
Three additional issues need to be considered in our examination of 
Act III of the ministerial exception.  First, some churches believe as a 
matter of religious doctrine that churches themselves ought to decide 
disputes with their ministers, even when they share the basic goals of the 
civil rights laws.47  They believe that disputes within the church should be 
resolved informally and not antagonistically, that internal dispute resolution 
is part of the shepherding function of the church and should be undertaken 
with compassion and care, that litigating such cases in the civil courts is a 
public scandal or causes irreparable harm to the relationship between 
church and minister, and so on.48 
Second, some churches hold complex views about the effect of an 
internal dispute on the relationship between the minister and the church.  
From a secular perspective, we may view the assertion of one‘s legal rights 
as a common, even laudable, phenomenon.  From a communal and religious 
perspective, however, such conduct may violate both church doctrine 
favoring the internal resolution of disputes and the spirit of community and 
peacefulness that guides the church.49 
 
46
  See, e.g., COLPA Brief, supra note 41, at 10 (citing a judgment in an employment dispute 
decided by a beth din, or rabbinic court, that ―substantially exceeded any judgment the employee could 
have obtained in a New York court‖); Religious Tribunal Experts‘ Brief, supra note 45, at 8 (noting that 
the Judicial Council of the United Methodist Church ―has issued over 1,100 decisions addressing diverse 
ecclesiastical issues within the UMC, including ministerial employment matters‖); id. at 8 n.9 (citing a 
decision of that tribunal in which it ordered the reinstatement of a clergy member, along with the 
payment of ―retroactive benefits and compensation,‖ after finding a violation of due process in the prior 
proceeding); id. at 19 n.55 (citing cases in which beth din courts found in favor of rabbis in employment 
disputes with synagogues); see generally Hadley, supra note 43 (discussing cases). 
47
  As Chris Lund explains: 
 
Even when churches agree with the principle of non-discrimination laws, they 
[may] still have quite understandable reasons to object to the government 
investigating, adjudicating, and remedying what the government decides are 
discriminatory acts.  There is all the difference in the world between a church 
pursuing its own values and the state enforcing those values back on the church. 
 
Lund, supra note 39, at 141–42. 
48
  These and other arguments can be found in Hadley, supra note 43. 
49
  See, e.g., Brief for International Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. at 22–
23, Hosanna-Tabor, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470840, at *22–23 (―In essence, the 
Church concluded that Perich‘s conduct [pressing her claims through the threat of litigation] impeded, 
and that she was not sufficiently committed to, the Church‘s religious mission.‖). 
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Third, even if a church takes neither of these positions, and even if it 
strongly opposes discrimination, it may have a different view of what 
constitutes ―discrimination.‖50  It is surely unsurprising that churches may 
champion the view that all are equal in God‘s eye, but take a different view 
than the law does about what constitutes equal status—concluding, for 
example, that women are equally beloved by God, but occupy a role in the 
church that does not involve the call to ministry. 
Churches need not hold any of these views, but they may hold some or 
all of them.  That matters for both Act II and Act III reasons.  First, it 
suggests that there are problems with the argument that the ministerial 
exception should not apply to retaliation suits.  Unlike a decision to fire an 
employee on religious grounds, the argument goes, a church‘s decision to 
fire an employee in retaliation for the exercise of her legal rights does not 
involve entanglement with religious doctrine; the court can accept that the 
church had religious reasons for retaliation but still conclude that churches 
are not exempt from antiretaliation laws.51  As we have seen, however, 
churches hold complex views with respect to the nature of their relationship 
with ministers and with the civil courts.  A plaintiff‘s decision to bring a 
retaliation action in a civil court, and not a religious one, can thus raise 
theological questions of a high order.  My own view is that the ministerial 
exception has more to do with the limits of state power than with questions 
of entanglement.  Regardless, there is little doubt that allowing 
antiretaliation suits to proceed raises serious entanglement concerns.52 
 
50
  See Lund, supra note 39, at 145 (―[M]ost churches see themselves as fully committed to racial 
justice, to gender equality, to treating the disabled with dignity, and to protecting the elderly.  But there 
is no reason to think that the church‘s conception of any of these things matches the state‘s 
conception.‖).  Churches can also take a view of ―discrimination‖ that is broader than its legal 
definition.  See id. at 146 (noting that some churches‘ aggressive efforts to increase the number of 
women in the ministry could violate current antidiscrimination law). 
51
  See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Respondent at 37, Hosanna-Tabor, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (No. 10-553), 
2011 WL 3319555, at *37.  There is an interesting inconsistency here.  Critics of the ministerial 
exception insist that the best way to avoid entanglement in retaliation cases is not to accept the courts‘ 
assertions of religious grounds on a blanket basis but to dismiss them as irrelevant under the rule in 
Smith.  Elsewhere, however, they argue that courts must not accept at face value a church‘s assertion 
that a particular employee is a minister but must instead engage in a careful consideration of the 
employee‘s ministerial status.  They then argue that this case-by-case approach would entangle the court 
in theological questions, and that the ministerial exception should therefore be abandoned.  See, e.g., 
Professors‘ Brief, supra note 27, at 32–35.  These critics, in short, argue for deference to the church‘s 
determinations in some cases and against deference in others; in both instances, their arguments 
ultimately favor the employee.  See also Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 19 (noting a similar 
inconsistency between the Hosanna-Tabor respondents‘ petition for certiorari and their merits brief: 
they initially complained that the ministerial exception is illegitimate because it ―require[s] a fact-
intensive inquiry,‖ and now complain that the ministerial exception ―is an overly ‗broad‘, ‗categorical‘, 
and ‗prophylactic immunity‘, inconsistent with case-by-case resolution of constitutional questions.‖). 
52
  See Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 23–27 (arguing that the ministerial exception must apply to 
antiretaliation claims). 
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These issues are especially relevant within the Act III realm.  There is 
a rich diversity of potential responses by churches to claims of 
discrimination on the part of a ministerial employee.  In concrete terms, 
they can offer anything from no process at all, to an informal and 
communal process, to a detailed trial process with substantial guarantees of 
fairness and impartiality.  Just as important, though, are the less concrete 
considerations.  Churches can treat discrimination complaints as disruptions 
or even insults to the church and its members.  Or they can take the view 
that the church has a religious duty to avoid discrimination, one that is 
every bit as central to the church as any other religious tenet.  They can treat 
these complaints as isolated incidents or as matters that demand a broad 
institutional response.  They can react with defensiveness or they can seek 
outreach, reconciliation, and growth.  They can view the complainant as an 
adversary and close ranks or they can try to approach that individual with 
compassion, care, and a sense of community. 
In sum, even if the ministerial exception continues to exist, a court‘s 
dismissal of a case on those grounds will not signal the end of churches‘ 
responsibilities, but rather the beginning.  Churches will still have many 
decisions to make.  Each one will reflect the church‘s deepest beliefs, its 
highest goals, and sometimes, its worst failings.  Indeed, most of the 
important questions about the ministerial exception will not arise until Act 
III. 
III. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND THE DUTY OF LAY AND PUBLIC 
DISCUSSION 
So far, I have argued that church leaders have a continuing obligation 
to think carefully about the proper occasions for the ministerial exception 
and about how to treat ministers‘ complaints.  That obligation carries a 
strong moral component.  A church must consider its own religious duties, 
including the obligation to treat complainants with love and compassion; it 
must consider its obligations as an institution functioning at least partly in 
the secular world. 
But the ministerial exception, like most allocations of power, does not 
just create duties for those who exercise it directly.  As a reflection of the 
church‘s role as a major infrastructural institution within society,53 the 
ministerial exception and its proper use should concern all of us.  




  See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 11 (manuscript at 224); Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches 
Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 274 
(2008) (link); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 39–40 (2002). 
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There is room here for both internal criticism and external public 
criticism.54  Even within rigidly hierarchical institutions, there is a great deal 
of room for internal discussion, dissent, and reform.  All institutions have 
many constituencies, any one of which can influence the institution‘s 
beliefs and actions.  Even where a church‘s doctrine is set solely by its 
leaders, those leaders must still consider the potential effects of their actions 
on their members and the risk that those members will abandon the church.  
The leadership may conclude that some doctrine is so important that it must 
be preserved even at the cost of losing members, but it will certainly be 
aware of that potential cost.  In less hierarchical religious institutions, it is 
even clearer that a church‘s treatment of its ministers is a communal matter 
that involves the whole church. 
These kinds of questions involve both specific religious norms and 
general civic norms.  In each dispute with a ministerial employee, the 
church and its members will have to consider not only what their religious 
tenets demand, but whether they have any general moral obligations to that 
employee and any general civic obligations to respect the social norms of 
nondiscrimination and conformity to the law. 
These questions should also be aired outside the church itself.  Citizens 
are not only permitted, but positively obliged to monitor and criticize our 
central social institutions, whether they belong to them or not.  They are 
responsible for the civic order as a whole, including the institutions that 
form the bedrock of that civic order. 
This duty is obvious when we are talking about the state, but it is just 
as true for private infrastructural institutions.  Whether the New York Times 
publishes the Pentagon Papers or shares materials from the Wikileaks 
archives is a decision to be made in the first instance by that newspaper, 
operating in accordance with professional and institutional norms, and not 
the state.55  But that paper‘s readers, and citizens more generally, have the 
duty to speak out if they believe that publication would threaten national 
security—or, conversely, to urge journalists to be even more aggressive in 
publishing information about important government actions that have been 
kept secret.  University professors make their own decisions about what to 
teach and what research to conduct, and those decisions are insulated from 
public interference.  This autonomy rests on several justifications, one 
being that academic freedom serves the public interest.56  But that autonomy 
 
54
  For discussions applying this point to a variety of ―First Amendment institutions,‖ see Horwitz, 
supra note 11. 
55
  See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (reversing an injunction 
preventing the New York Times from publishing classified material) (link); see also Reply Brief, supra 
note 33, at 26 (noting several areas of the law, all of them involving public or private institutions such as 
the press, in which ―[legal] claims or remedies are barred because the resulting litigation would be too 
problematic or too threatening to other constitutional values‖). 
56
  See, e.g., MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF 
AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 44 (2009) (―Academic freedom is the price the public must pay in 
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does not prohibit the public from monitoring and criticizing what 
universities do.  To the contrary, it is a civic duty to do so, even—or 
perhaps especially—when the final authority rests with the institution itself. 
These principles also apply to churches.  If one believes that churches 
are a fundamental part of our social infrastructure, and that this requires 
some degree of church autonomy and some limits on state authority, then 
surely one must believe that churches‘ decisions are as subject to public 
commendation or criticism as the actions of any other major social 
institution.  Churches may not be answerable in a legal sense for actions 
that lie at the heart of their institutional roles any more than newspapers are 
legally accountable to the public for decisions of whether to publish 
stories.57  But they are not immune from public criticism, and they are not 
indifferent to it either.  Like any other institution, they are susceptible to 
moral suasion, reasoned argument, positive and negative reinforcement, and 
public pressure.  Citizens who care about our central social institutions can 
and should provide exactly those sorts of pressures. 
All this is worth emphasizing because I have no interest in painting a 
rosy picture of churches or any other central social institution.  Church 
independence, like freedom of the press, academic autonomy, and other 
institutionally-oriented constitutional freedoms, is grounded in a variety of 
ideas: that the state is limited in its authority, that our social infrastructure 
encompasses a variety of non-state institutions with their own spheres of 
authority, that our constitutional settlement assumes these divisions of 
authority, that courts are relatively incompetent to second-guess these 
institutions‘ core decisions, and others.58  To subscribe to this structural 
view of the importance of both state and non-state institutions in our social 
and constitutional firmament, one need not believe that churches and other 
institutions are perfect or that they will never abuse their autonomy.  
Churches most certainly are not perfect and they will sometimes abuse their 
autonomy.  It is unfortunate, but unsurprising, that the briefs in support of 
the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor say so much about churches‘ abuse of 
authority, and the briefs in support of churches say so little about it.  
Churches surely will fire ministers for good reasons, bad reasons, and 
sometimes for no reason at all. 
Supporters of the ministerial exception, and church autonomy more 
broadly, must therefore avoid idealizing churches.  They must acknowledge 
 
return for the social good of advancing knowledge.‖); LOUIS MENAND, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: 
REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 130 (2010). 
57
  There are limits, of course, in both cases.  Newspapers can be held accountable for libelous 
statements, and churches can be liable for injuries to members or third parties, whether they involve 
clergy sexual abuse or a church-owned van, driven by a minister, accidentally running over an old lady 
in the street.  See Reply Brief, supra note 33, at 20.  But these peripheral limits do not say much about 
institutional autonomy in core cases, like the hiring or firing of ministers. 
58
  These and other justifications are canvassed, and sometimes criticized, in my forthcoming book.  
See HORWITZ, supra note 11. 
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that all legal autonomy, even of a limited sort, carries risks of abuse.  If we 
are right about the deep nature of the constitutional settlement between 
church and state, about the valuable role played by independent churches in 
our constitutional and social infrastructure, and about the relative lack of 
judicial and legislative competence and authority when it comes to core 
church functions such as the selection of ministers, then the risk of abuse 
should not shake us from our position.  But a candid recognition of these 
concerns may lead to a more realistic and productive conversation.  It may 
lead us to think more clearly about the role of internal and external 
monitoring by church authorities, the laity, and citizens at large in 
encouraging churches to wield their power prayerfully, compassionately, 
and responsibly. 
Conversely, recognizing the role of internal and external discussion 
and criticism may encourage the critics of the ministerial exception to ease 
up on their alarmist rhetoric.  Some of the briefs in Hosanna-Tabor are 
crammed with language suggesting that churches are barely leashed 
monsters, waiting for a chance to run amok.  They describe churches as 
espousing ―a capacious theory of unaccountability,‖59 warn of a ―lawless 
zone of defiance‖60 that would have ―devastating‖ consequences, and urge 
the Court to reject any grant of ―a special privilege to religious 
employers . . . that makes them a power unto themselves, separate and apart 
from the democratic will of the community.‖61  That is impoverished Act II 
thinking.  It ignores the likelihood that most employment decisions made by 
churches will be made in good faith, and it assumes quite wrongly that the 
only effective check against abuse is a legal one.  Public pressure and 
institutional reconsideration, not judicial relief, led the Los Angeles Police 
Department to abandon its chokehold policy and convinced the United 
States to stop bombing Cambodia.62 
In short, consequentialist arguments against the ministerial exception 
will be wildly inaccurate unless they acknowledge the role of internal 
discussion and public criticism in shaping the institutional norms, policies, 
and actions of churches.63  We cannot properly assess the costs and benefits 
 
59
  Brief of Bishopaccountability.org et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 23, 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (No. 10-533), 
2011 WL 3532696, at *23. 
60
  Professors‘ Brief, supra note 27, at 2. 
61
  Brief of Amicus Curiae Neil H. Cogan in Support of Respondents Urging Affirmance at 4, 
Hosanna-Tabor, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (No. 10-533), 2011 WL 3532697, at *4.  I am not sure why it is more 
ominous to think of churches, an important mediating institution, as being ―separate and apart from the 
democratic will of the community‖ than it is to think of them as abject servants of the popular will, 
subject to majority rule even with respect to core operations such as the selection of ministers. 
62
  See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
63
  It should be clear, moreover, that many of the arguments against the ministerial exception are 
consequentialist, and that the implications of those arguments are very broad.  As I argued earlier, even 
if the Supreme Court holds that the ministerial exception is not constitutionally required, it could still 
allow legislatures to enact some form of exception.  The briefs in Hosanna-Tabor are limited to the 
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of the ministerial exception or church autonomy—or, indeed, any other 
form of institutional autonomy—until we break out of a false dichotomy in 
which one side is blind to anything except state power, and the other side 
treats the church, the press, and other institutions as paragons of virtue.  The 
former approach pays too little attention to vast stretches of our 
constitutional structure and culture and ignores the vital and often under-
examined role of ―communities and movements‖ within our broader system 
of constitutionalism.64  The latter approach will leave many difficult 
questions unaddressed and will lack a full sense of moral accountability and 
integrity, unless it acknowledges the costs of institutionalism.  We must talk 
candidly about potential abuses of the ministerial exception.  But we must 
do so in a way that accounts for all the ways of addressing those abuses, 
including internal and public discussion within and about churches, not just 
state coercion. 
CONCLUSION 
To be clear, I think the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor should 
reaffirm the ministerial exception, treating it as a necessary implication of 
both the historical church-state settlement and the basic principles of the 
 
constitutional question, but at least one of them, along with some scholarship by critics of the exception, 
suggests that any broad ministerial exception, including a statutory one, would be unconstitutional, bad 
policy, or both.  See, e.g., Professors‘ Brief, supra note 27, at 4–16, 30–31, 36 (offering consequentialist 
arguments against the ministerial exception and arguing that the proper approach in light of these 
consequences is to ―[a]pply employment discrimination law to a religious employer in the same way it 
would be applied to a secular employer,‖ with the only apparent protection of any kind being a narrow 
form of message-based associational freedom); Leslie C. Griffin, Smith and Women’s Equality, 
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1831, 1835 (2011) (criticizing legislatures for ―seek[ing] to undo Smith‘s regime 
by exempting religious groups from the law‖) (link); id. at 1853 (―There is no good constitutional or 
policy reason to allow religious organizations to retaliate against their workers‖).  In fairness, some of 
these critics concede that some form of exception might be constitutionally required or permissible as a 
legislative matter.  See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 33, at 2038 (suggesting that churches could still invoke 
a relatively narrow form of associational freedom in some cases); Leslie C. Griffin, No Law Respecting 
the Practice of Religion, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 475, 492 (2008) (contemplating some form of 
ministerial exception, but only where it involves core religious conduct) [hereinafter Griffin, No Law] 
(link); Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 1099, 1195–96 (arguing that legislatures could create a statutory ministerial exception).  
To the extent that the critics‘ broader arguments are consequentialist, however, they call into question 
not only any future statutory ministerial exception, but the existing statutory exceptions for religious 
employers.  See, e.g., Griffin, No Law, supra (arguing that the leading decision upholding Title VII‘s 
exemption for religious employers who discriminate on the basis of religion, Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, was wrong to the extent 
that it allowed a church to select a non-ministerial employee on the basis of religion (citing 483 U.S. 327 
(1987))).  These kinds of consequentialist arguments will be inaccurate unless they account for nonlegal 
methods of restraint as well as legal methods. 
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  See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68 (1983) (link); id. 
at 4 (―The rules and principles of justice, the formal institutions of the law, and the conventions of a 
social order are, indeed, important to that world; they are, however, but a small part of the normative 
universe that ought to claim our attention.‖). 
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Religion Clauses.  In addition, I believe the ministerial exception stands in 
for broader constitutional and political principles: that state power is vital 
but limited, that our social and constitutional infrastructure contains not just 
a single monolithic authority but a number of key independent institutions, 
and that pluralism, public discourse, and freedom are best served by 
appreciating the extent to which these institutions are and should be self-
governing.65 
But recognizing the power that churches and other central institutions 
possess is just the beginning of the conversation.  Just as important as the 
scope of that power is the question of what should be done with it.  We 
impoverish ourselves by talking only in Act II terms; by acting as if every 
important question is settled once we know whether the state or the church 
has the whip hand.  We fail to appreciate the richness of institutional life in 
a pluralistic society, and the duty of both citizens and institutions to 
participate in that society after the court has spoken.  Institutional autonomy 
is real, but it is a burden as well as a freedom.  To have a ―free Church in a 
free State,‖ we need responsible churches and responsible citizens.  We 
must begin to think about our own parts in the drama once the curtain 
comes up on Act III. 
 
65
  See HORWITZ, supra note 11 (manuscript at 16–20). 
